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SECOND-BEST THEORY AND LAW & ECONOMICS:
AN INTRODUCTION
RICHARD S. MARKOVITS*
According to The General Theory of Second Best,' if one or
more members of a set of optimal conditions cannot be fulfilled, there
is no general reason to believe that fulfilling (or more closely approxi-
mating) more of the remaining conditions will bring you closer to the
optimum than fulfilling fewer of the remaining conditions. Second-
Best Theory has startling implications for law-and-economics analysis.
Most importantly, it undermines the standard law-and-economics as-
sumption that any policy or choice that reduces the number or magni-
tude of the Pareto imperfections 2 in the economy will on that account
increase "allocative efficiency": 3 because two Pareto imperfections
can counteract each other, one cannot assume without further argu-
* Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr. Centennial Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School.
B.A., Cornell University (1963); Ph.D., London School of Economics (1966); LL.B., Yale Uni-
versity, (1968); M.A., Oxford University (1981).
1. For the first formal statement of The General Theory of Second Best (and the first use
of this name), see R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV.
ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).
2. Welfare economics delineates seven (arguably eight) conditions whose fulfillment guar-
antees Pareto optimality. The statement that an economy is Pareto optimal in the pure sense
indicates that, even if no transaction costs would have to be incurred to reallocate resources, it
would be impossible to reallocate resources in a way that would make somebody better off with-
out making anyone else worse off. The statement that the economy is Pareto optimal in the
impure and somewhat inaccurate sense in which I am using (and virtually all economists in prac-
tice use) this expression indicates that, even if no transaction costs would have to be incurred to
reallocate resources, it would be impossible to effectuate a reallocation that would give its bene-
ficiaries the equivalent of more dollars than it would take away from its victims. The Pareto-
optimal conditions are (1) no monopoly, (2) no monopsony, (3) no externalities, (4) no taxes on
the margin of income, (5) individual sovereignty, (6) no failures to maximize, and (7) no
problems caused by consumer surplus or its analogues (usually misdescribed as "no public
goods"). The eighth arguable condition is that no transaction costs need be incurred to fulfill the
other seven conditions. This Article uses the expression "Pareto imperfection" to refer to any
departure from one of the basic seven Pareto-optimal conditions.
3. I substitute "allocative-efficiency" analysis for the standard term "economic-efficiency"
analysis to remind readers that the concept is a technical term and that one cannot assume that
choices that increase allocative efficiency are either desirable from any legitimate personal-ulti-
mate-value perspective or consistent with our rights-commitments. In any event, in my terminol-
ogy, a choice is said to increase or decrease allocative efficiency if the equivalent-dollar gains it
confers on its beneficiaries exceed the equivalent-dollar losses it imposes on its victims. For a
critique of the standard economic definition and use of the concept of the effect of a choice on
allocative efficiency, see Richard S. Markovits, A Constructive Critique of the Traditional Defini-
tion and Use of the Concept of "the Effect of a Choice on Allocative (Economic) Efficiency": Why
the Kaldor-Hicks Test, the Coase Theorem, and Virtually All Law-and-Economics Welfare Argu-
ments Are Wrong, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 485 [hereinafter Markovits, Constructive Critique].
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ment that a situation in which there are fewer or smaller Pareto im-
perfections will be more allocatively efficient than one in which there
are more or larger Pareto imperfections. More specifically, The Gen-
eral Theory of Second Best demonstrates that (1) the fact that "per-
fect competition among sellers and buyers" are Pareto-optimal
conditions does not imply that policies that increase competition will
tend to increase allocative efficiency on that account in a still-Pareto-
imperfect world; (2) the fact that "no externalities" is a Pareto-opti-
mal condition does not imply that policies that internalize externalities
will tend to increase allocative efficiency on that account in a still-
Pareto-imperfect world; (3) the fact that "no taxes on the margin of
income" is a Pareto-optimal condition does not imply that policies
that reduce taxes on the margin of income will tend to increase alloca-
tive efficiency on that account in a still-Pareto-imperfect world; (4) the
fact that individual "sovereignty" and "maximization" (no human er-
rors) are Pareto-optimal conditions does not imply that policies that
increase the information available to human actors (e.g., by indicating
the contents and nutritional value of food-products) or reduce the
probability that they will do their maths wrong (e.g., by indicating the
price per ounce of food-products) will tend on those accounts to in-
crease allocative efficiency in a still-Pareto-imperfect world; or (5) the
fact that "no buyer surplus" is a Pareto-optimal condition does not
imply that policies that allow sellers to convert buyer surplus into
seller surplus or that government grants that offset such surplus will
tend on that account to increase allocative efficiency in a still-Pareto-
imperfect world.
Second-Best Theory also undermines the way in which those law-
and-economics scholars who make their overall evaluation of a policy
depend on its distributional consequences 4 evaluate the distributional
desirability of a policy or choice (rights-considerations aside). In par-
ticular, Second-Best Theory demonstrates that
(1) because a distributional imperfection whose elimination would
have been desirable from the relevant value-perspective were
it the only distributional imperfection in the economy is as
likely to have counteracted the net distributional distortion
4. Many law-and-economics scholars have operated on the assumptions that (1) any policy
or choice that increases allocative efficiency is desirable overall and consistent with our rights-
commitments and (2) any policy or choice that decreases allocative efficiency is undesirable
overall and not required by our rights-commitments. Both these assumptions are incorrect. See
Markovits, Constructive Critique, supra note 3; Richard S. Markovits, The Relevance of Eco-
nomic-Efficiency Conclusions for Moral-Ought, Moral-Rights, and Legal-Rights Analysis (un-




generated by the other distributional imperfections in the sys-
tem as to have compounded it,
(2) the elimination or reduction of an individual distributional im-
perfection cannot be assumed without further argument to im-
prove the distributional desirability of the society's allocation
of resources from that value-perspective.
In addition, Second-Best Theory has implications for the design
of decisionmaking institutions. Assume that one could define an orga-
nizational structure, a set of organizational-finance arrangements, a
set of personnel-recruitment and personnel-retention policies, a set of
institutional-outsider participation-rights, a set of individual-deci-
sionmaker decision-standards, and an institutional-voting procedure
that would 'enable the institution to maximize its "output" (given the
constraints imposed by our society's rights-commitments). Because,
in practice, one will not be dealing with institutions whose only imper-
fection is the imperfection one is in a position to reduce or eliminate
and an imperfection in one of the above arrangements may counteract
the net effect of the other imperfections in the institution, Second-
Best Theory demonstrates that one cannot assume without further ar-
gument that a policy that eliminates or reduces one institutional im-
perfection will improve the functioning of the institution in question.
Finally, Second-Best Theory raises the possibility that it might be
allocatively efficient, desirable overall, or rights-required to instruct
the imperfect decisionmakers who are currently operating in our im-
perfect decisionmaking institutions to take approaches to the issues
they must resolve that would not be ideal if they and their institutions
were first-best perfect.5
5. This issue has important jurisprudential implications. Assume that there is a first-best
way to analyze the moral rights or legal rights of an individual. If the personnel assigned the role
of executing the relevant rights-analysis or the institutional framework within which they are
operating are not "first-best" ideal (see the text infra), would these facts justicize (render just)
changing the approach that the relevant decisionmakers are instructed to take to the rights issues
they must decide if their use of such a non-first-best approach would increase the accuracy of
their decisions (in some difficult-to-specify sense)? For example, if the first-best way for consti-
tutional-rights decisions to be made were to adopt an approach in which "arguments of moral
principle" were dominant but Supreme Court justices were not selected through an ideal process
and were not given enough time to analyze individual cases, might a highly-imperfect analytic
approach such as some form of strict constructionism be a third-best (see infra) response to these
latter two imperfections and, if it were, would this fact justicize the use of this imperfect analytic
approach? I doubt that strict constructionism or any other imperfect approach to legal analysis
would improve judicial decisions from a rights perspective. However, I must admit that, even if I
were convinced to the contrary, I would be reluctant to conclude that that fact would justicize
the use of such an imperfect analytic approach. This reluctance may reflect my belief that in this
situation a rights-based society is obligated to change its personnel-recruitment practices and
other features of the relevant adjudicative institution's design to make the "first-best" analytic
approach third-best as well. For a detailed analysis of my claim that arguments of moral princi-
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The articles in this Symposium focus almost exclusively on the
implications of Second-Best Theory for allocative-efficiency predic-
tion.6 On the positive side, they point out some or many of the ways
in which the analysis of the allocative efficiency of particular contract-
law doctrines, tort-law doctrines, health-and-safety regulations, pub-
lic-utility regulations, and environmental taxes must be altered to take
Second-Best Theory into account. On the negative side, they explic-
itly describe or implicitly reveal the failure of virtually all extant anal-
yses of the allocative efficiency of the doctrines and rules in question
to deal adequately or at all with the problems Second-Best Theory
highlights.7
Virtually all law-and-economics scholars (indeed, virtually all
economists) have responded in one of two unsatisfactory ways to The
General Theory of Second Best. The overwhelming majority have
either ignored the theory or denied its validity and proceeded on the
assumption that any choice that decreases the number or magnitude
of Pareto imperfections will tend on that account to improve resource
allocation. I use the acronym "FBLE" to stand for the type of first-
best-allocative-efficiency analysis that adopts this assumption because
"FBLE" resembles the word "fable" and these analyses are based on
the "fable" that a decrease in a particular Pareto imperfection neces-
sarily increases allocative efficiency (or that the imperfection on which
the analyst is focusing is the only imperfection in the system).
pie are the dominant form of legitimate legal argument in our culture, see RICHARD S. MARKO-
vrrs, MATFERS OF PRINCIPLE: LEGITIMATE LEGAL ARGUMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (forthcoming New York University Press, Aug. 1998). See also Markovits,
Economic-Efficiency Relevance, supra note 4.
6. I hasten to add that I do not think that allocative-efficiency analysis is an algorithm for
the generation of right answers to most common-law, Constitutional, or statutory rights-ques-
tions, though some statutes may promulgate an allocative-efficiency test of legality and the inter-
nally-right answer to some moral-rights-related common-law and Constitutional questions may
be the answer that maximizes allocative efficiency. See also Markovits, Economic-Efficiency
Relevance, supra note 4.
7. Three of the contributions to this symposium explicitly point out the fact that the extant
literature on the topics they explore largely ignores Second-Best Theory. See Thomas S. Ulen,
Judgment and the General Theory of Second Best in Law and Economics, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
189, 191 (1998); Andrew P. Morriss, Implications of Second-Best Theory for Administrative and
Regulatory Law: A Case Study of Public Utility Regulation, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 135, 136-37
(1998); Richard S. Markovits, The Allocative Efficiency of Shifting From a "Negligence" System
to a "Strict Liability" Regime in Our Highly-Pareto-Imperfect Economy: A Partial and Prelimi-
nary Third-Best Allocative-Efficiency Analysis, 73 CHI-KENT L. REv. 11, 23 (1998). Although
the fourth article's discussion of the literature on the topic it addresses does not make this point
explicitly, it reveals the failure of the literature to take adequate account of Second-Best Theory.
See Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Environmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend Hypoth-
esis: Did You Really Expect Something for Nothing? 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 221 (1998).
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A few economists have rejected such FBLE analysis in favor of
general-equilibrium models that determine the most-ailocatively-effi-
cient policy-response to one or more specific Pareto imperfection(s).
These economists assume that the economy (1) contains a small
number of other imperfections that can be accurately and costlessly
determined and (2) uses resources in only one or two different ways.
Such highly-unrealistic, incomplete general-equilibrium analyses can
provide many useful insights. However, given that, in reality, (1)
Pareto imperfections abound, (2) data and analysis are inevitably in-
accurate and costly, and (3) resources are used in a great many differ-
ent ways, it would not be allocatively efficient (even if it were feasible)
to use a complete version of this general-equilibrium approach to de-
termine the most-allocatively-efficient response to a particular Pareto
imperfection. I call the complete version of this general-equilibrium
approach "second-best-allocative-efficiency analysis." "SBLE" is an
appropriate acronym for this approach because SBLE resembles the
word "sable," which signifies a beautiful object that is prohibitively
expensive, and SBLE analysis would be prohibitively expensive even
if it were doable, given the imperfectness of the economy, the multi-
plicity of resource uses, and the inevitable cost and inaccuracy of both
data and analysis.
Virtually no economists or law-and-economics scholars have
given significant thought to the type of allocative-efficiency analysis
that would be efficient to employ in our worse-than-second-best
world, in which (1) Pareto imperfections are pervasive, (2) resource-
use types are multiplicious, and (3) data and analysis are costly and
inaccurate. I use the acronym "TBLE" to stand for the type of "third-
best-allocative-efficiency" analysis that would be ex ante allocatively
efficient in such a worse-than-second-best world. TBLE analysis dif-
fers from SBLE analysis in that it considers the inevitable cost and
inaccuracy of data and analysis when deciding how many resources to
allocate to collecting data and analyzing their significance. TBLE is
an appropriate acronym for this type of analysis because it resembles
the word "table" and TBLE analysis is the type one should bring to
the policy-evaluation table.8
If Second-Best Theory has critical implications for the proper ap-
proach to allocative-efficiency analysis, why have law-and-economics
8. For a partial and preliminary TBLE analysis, see my contribution to this symposium.
Markovits, supra note 7.
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scholars and various other sorts of economists chosen to ignore it? I
can offer nine partial explanations.
First, some of the relevant scholars ignore Second-Best Theory
because they are understandably reluctant to face up to or admit their
errors. Second, some fail to take account of Second-Best Theory be-
cause they do not want to tool up to put themselves in a position to
execute TBLE analyses. Third, some mathematical economists who
are willing to execute partial SBLE analyses refuse to adopt the third-
best approach that Second-Best Theory really commends because
they find it aesthetically unpleasing and intellectually dubious to ig-
nore theoretical interdependencies that one has established and to
base conclusions on the kinds of highly-imperfect data and guesti-
mates that will often be third-best-allocatively-efficient (TBLE) to
employ. Fourth, many applied economists and law-and-economics
scholars ignore Second-Best Theory because they fear that it will lead
governments to decrease allocative efficiency by intervening in the
economy more often via more selective policies-i.e., to intervene in
situations in which interventions would be allocatively efficient and/or
overall desirable if government decisionmaking institutions and deci-
sionmakers were first-best ideal but (they believe) will in practice be
allocatively inefficient and/or undesirable overall, given the govern-
ment's actual imperfections. Fifth, many economists choose to disre-
gard Second-Best Theory because they fear that the more
interventionist government they believe it favors will make rights-vio-
lating choices the theory does not recommend. Sixth, many law
professors and an increasing number of economists ignore Second-
Best Theory because they like clear bottom lines and correctly per-
ceive that TBLE analysis will often lead to conclusions that are fact-
dependent and, on that account, contestable. Seventh, many law
professors and an increasing number of economists refuse to take Sec-
ond-Best Theory into account because they want to have policy influ-
ence, realize that second-best and third-best arguments are more
difficult to comprehend than first-best arguments appear to be, and
believe that the "policy audience" lacks the inclination and patience to
follow TBLE arguments. (These scholars may also fear [unjustifiably]
that the policy audience lacks the intelligence or intellectual sophisti-
cation to comprehend such arguments.) Eighth, many law professors
who address issues whose analysis should be at least partially eco-
nomic ignore Second-Best Theory because they reject all allocative-
efficiency analysis: these scholars have been turned off economics by
the philosophically-naive claim of many economists that public
[Vol. 73:3
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choices should be assessed solely in terms of their allocative efficiency
and have failed to appreciate that, in combination with personal-ulti-
mate-value analysis and rights analysis, allocative-efficiency analysis
can make a valuable contribution to the evaluation of public (and pri-
vate) choices from both moral-rights perspectives and some personal-
ultimate-value perspectives. Ninth and finally, many economists and
legal academics who study law-and-economics questions have been
deterred from taking Second-Best Theory seriously by the difficulty of
publishing articles or books that give it adequate consideration: most
pure economics journals have page-constraints that preclude authors
from developing the relevant second-best and third-best theory and
justifying it by investigating a real problem in illuminating detail;
although the law-and-economics journals have less severe page-con-
straints, they have tended to be run by Chicago economists, who have
both personal professional and ideological reasons to ignore Second-
Best Theory; economics journals, law-and-economics journals, and
university presses use peer-review systems, which give a crucial role to
scholars who are likely to be hostile to SBLE and TBLE analysis; and
student-run law reviews are edited by individuals who do not have the
expertise to evaluate the importance of Second-Best Theory them-
selves, do not like to ask people who are not members of their Review
to assess the submissions they receive, virtually always ask law profes-
sors for advice in the rare cases in which they do seek "outside" coun-
sel, and are, in any case, very much creatures of fashion.9
Obviously, few law-and-economics scholars are influenced by all
nine of the considerations just listed. However, these factors do seem
to account for the failure of the overwhelming majority of such schol-
ars to give Second-Best Theory the consideration it deserves. Clearly,
none can provide a basis for a justification of the refusal of economists
and law-and-economics scholars to restructure their work in the way
that Second-Best Theory demonstrates is necessary.
My experience in organizing this Symposium both confirms the
continuing refusal of talented law-and-economics scholars to take Sec-
ond-Best Theory into consideration and provides some basis for opti-
mism that the relevant attitudes and practices are on the verge of
9. However, the Chicago-Kent Law Review is a tremendous improvement on the norm by
combining aspects of a student-run journal with a peer-review journal. In conjunction with an
oversight committee of three faculty members, the law review editorial board chooses sympo-
sium topics based on proposals submitted to the Law Review. Once the symposium topic has
been approved by the students and the faculty oversight committee, the symposium editor is
responsible for soliciting authors to participate in the symposium.
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changing. Several of the highly-respected law-and-economics scholars
whose participation I sought responded by saying that they knew
nothing about Second-Best Theory and had no desire to learn about it
or respond to it. Two potential participants responded by articulating
the theory accurately, pointing out that the profession has chosen to
ignore it, and stating that they saw no reason to depart from the pro-
fessional "norm." On the other hand, not only the contributors to this
symposium but also several others who had outstanding obligations
that precluded their participation responded to my invitation by say-
ing (in essence): "It's about time that Second-Best Theory be given
this type of attention. The General Theory of Second Best must be
made the linchpin of all allocative-efficiency analyses." I hope that
this Symposium persuades you that this conclusion is correct.
